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Lekcja anatomii wedle Rembrandta
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(Happening realizowany kikakrotnie: w 
Kunsthalle w  Norymberdze (1968), w  Galerii 
Foksal w  Warszawie (1969), w  Dourdan 
pod Paryżem (wrzesień 1971), w  Henri 
Onstad Kunstsenter w  Oslo (październik 
1971). Trwał ok. 1 godziny.)
wystarczy zrobić tylko pierwszy krok,
odważyć się coś oddzielić,






oddzielam jedną warstwę od drugiej,
teraz natrafiamy na cienki pokład waty,


















nadać sylwetkę i formę,
stworzyć styl.
I oto jesteśmy już na antypodach ubioru!
kieszienie!
mnóstwo kieszeni!
nie dajmy się zmylić konwencjonalnym
i nic nieznaczącym pozorom,
popatrzmy na nie z boku,
pod innym kątem
Anatomy Lesson According to Rembrandt
score of the Happening
(The Happening was realised several times: 
in the Kunsthalle in Nüremberg (1968), in 
the Foksal Gallery in Warsaw  (1969), in 
Dourdan near Paris (September 1971), and 
in Henri Onstad Art Centre in Oslo (October 
1971). Duration about 1 hour.)
it is enough just to take the first step,
to dare to separate something,






and here is the bottom one!
I separate layers one from another,
now we meet the thin cotton padding,
















to confer a profile and a form,
to create a style.




let us not be tricked by conventional
or insignificant outward appearance,
let us look without prejudice,
from different angles,
albo od środka,
w żałosnym stanie utraconej pozycji,
kiedy zwisają, kiedy nie możemy już w  nie 
wsadzić rąk,
zastanówmy się co właściwie oznaczają
te szczególne schowki,
intymne i dwuznaczne zaułki,
spoufalone i totumfackie,
przewrotne i anonimowe,
nie obawiajmy się śmiałych określeń:
to są po prostu zwyczajne t o r b y !
nie miejmy złudzeń!




































or from the inside,
in the piteous state of dislocation
when they hang down, when we are now 
unable to insert our hands,
we puzzle over what these special
compartments actually mean,
these intimate and ambiguous dead ends,
familiar and confiding,
perverse and anonymous,
let us not fear bold expressions:
these are quite simply ordinary b a g s !
let us not be under any illusions!





























this is the interesting contents and stuffing 
of
these intimate hiding places
and secret repositories,












koniec z tzw. partycypacją!
Sources: Tadeusz Kantor, Pisma, ed. by 
Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz, 3 vols (Wrocław 
and Kraków: Ossolineum and Cricoteka, 
2004-2005), I  (2004), p. 356 (for details of 
performances); Kantor, Ambalaże (Warsaw: 
Galeria Foksal, 1976), p. 26 (for title, main 
text and layout); Tadeusz Kantor: Z 
Archiwum Galerii Foksal, ed. by Małgorzata 
Jurkiewicz, Joanna Mytkowska, and Andrzej 
Przywara (Warsaw: Fundacja Galerii 
Foksal, 1998), p. 187 (for graffiti in 
photograph of final installation).
the shameful litter,
these wrinkled and crushed






the so-called participation is over!
The final line is a translation of the graffiti 
scrawled on the gallery wall next to the final 
installation of mounted clothing (see 
photographs in Tadeusz Kantor: Z 
Archiwum Galerii Foksal, p. 197).
Artists often use oblique strategies to explore the nature of human being and 
Tadeusz Kantor was no exception. A consistent foundation of his aesthetic was a 
twofold preoccupation with what he referred to as  realność najniższej rangi (the 
reality of the lowest rank) and przedmiot biedny (the poor object). This aesthetic 
prioritised a poor, lowly, and degraded reality at the margins of existence: a form of 
being that dwells in the liminal zero-zone between existence and non-existence. This 
essay offers a new interpretation of Tadeusz Kantor’s happening, the Anatomy 
Lesson According to Rembrandt, and situates it with respect to this  aesthetic 
preoccupation, which, it will argue, arose out of Kantor’s exposure to a particular kind 
of reality whilst a witness to aspects of the Nazi ‘Final Solution’. This early, key 
experience in occupied Kraków will be shown to relate to Kantor’s reading of the 
work of the Jewish graphic artist and short-story writer Bruno Schulz, whose own 
aesthetic strategies of inverting dominant ontological hierarchies can be seen to 
inform Kantor’s own artistic practice. Implicit in this strategy is  a critique of 
representational ontology as  prioritizing a substantialist concept of being over the 
more dynamic and mutable concepts of becoming and seeming, a reading of reality 
that Schulz championed. In his performative staging of Rembrandt’s  painting, Kantor 
can be seen to challenge conventional ontological hierarchies in a way that both 
echoes Schulz’s  metaphysics  and prefigures a sense of the immanence of life as 
elaborated in the work of Gilles Deleuze.
Kantor first performed his Anatomy Lesson in Nüremberg in 1968;1 Rembrandt 
produced his painting in 1632, at a time when the culture of attending the public 
dissection of corpses  in anatomy theatres had become a mark of civic respectability.2 
Kantor had lived through the Second World War in the Polish city of Kraków and his 
Anatomy Lesson was performed when so-called realny socjalizm (real socialism)3 
was coming to dominate Polish cultural and political institutions, during an epoch that 
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1  This happening was realised several times, as stated in the translated passage. As well as the 
sources cited above, fragments of the Polish text have been published in Grammatica 3 (1969). There 
is an English translation by Charles S. Kraszewski in his unpublished manuscript ʻCollected Theatrical 
Works and Happeningsʼ  in the Cricoteka archival collection (pp. 437-40), and, more recently, an 
English translation was published in the book accompanying the 2005 exhibition in Vienna and 
Warsaw: The Impossible Theater: Performativity in the Works of Pawel Althamer, Tadeusz Kantor, 
Katarzyna Kozyra, Robert Kusmirowski and Artur Zmijewski, ed. by Hanna Wróblewska, Jarosław 
Suchan, and Sabine Folie (Nürnberg: Verlag für Moderne Kunst Nürnberg, 2006), p. 109. The 
happening was filmed; edited fragments can be seen in the film Kantor ist da: Die Künstler und seine 
Welt (Kantor is Here: The Artist and His World), directed by Dietrich Mahlow (1969), which is available 
on a DVD included with Sztuka jest przestępstwem: Tadeusz Kantor a Niemcy i Szwajcaria. 
Wspomnienia – Dokumenty – Eseje – Filmy DVD (Kraków and Nüremberg: Cricoteka and Verlag für 
Moderne Kunst Nürnberg, 2007) and also in the collection of DVDs The Theatre of Tadeusz Kantor 
available from Andrzej Białko (abialko@op.pl). I am grateful for the assistance of Elżbieta Kaproń, 
Tomasz Macios, and Professor Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz in making this translation of Kantorʼs partytura.
2  See Jonathan Sawday, The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance 
Culture (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 150.
3  ʻReal socialismʼ  came into widespread use in the 1970s. The term designated the predominantly 
bureaucratic (rather than idealistic) forms of socialism practised in Poland and other Soviet satellite 
states in particular.
Theodor Adorno had recently defined as marked by the question of how to live ‘after 
Auschwitz’.4  The corpse that is the subject of Doctor Nicolaes Tulp’s dissection in 
Rembrandt’s painting was a thief from Leiden (ironically Amsterdam’s  rival in the 
staging of civic anatomies) named Adriaen Adriaenszoon, who had been executed on 
31 January 1632 for stealing a coat; in Kantor’s Anatomy it is the clothing that is 
dissected rather than the human being.5
In his 1926 poem ‘Sailing to Byzantium’ W. B. Yeats, railing against the 
approach of old age, wrote that ‘An aged man is  but a paltry thing, | A tattered coat 
upon a stick, unless | Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing, | For every tatter 
in its mortal dress’.6  This  notion of the soul animating the tatters of mortal clothing 
invokes the spectre of Plato’s formulation of the soul’s separate identity from, and 
superiority to, the body.7 However, as Martin Heidegger has argued in his 1940 essay 
‘The Age of the World Picture’: ‘It is in the metaphysics of Descartes that, for the first 
time, the being is defined as the objectness  of representation, and truth as the 
certainty of representation’.8  Although René Descartes’ famous conceptions of 
subjectivity were not available until his  publications of 1637 and 1641, the 
philosopher was living in Holland and studying anatomy whilst formulating his 
philosophical position and was in Amsterdam at the time when Rembrandt was 
working on his painting.9  During this  time (1629–1633) Descartes was working on 
texts that included his Treatise on Man, a vision of mechanical beings ‘composed as 
we are, of a soul and a body’, which he planned to describe separately. Unfortunately 
his plan to include a description of the soul and ‘finally […] show you how these two 
natures would have to be joined and united to constitute men and resemble us’,10 
was abandoned at this time. This vision of the world and the figures described in it 
was nothing less than a recasting of the idea of nature as  a mechanistic and 
6
4  See, for example, Adornoʼs ʻThe Meaning of Working through the Pastʼ (1959), ʻEducation After 
Auschwitzʼ (1967), and ʻLecture Fourteen, “The Liquidation of the Self”ʼ (1965), in Theodor W. Adorno, 
Can One Live after Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader, ed. by Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 3-18, 19-33, and 427-36, respectively.
5 See Sawday, The Body Emblazoned, p. 150.
6 William Butler Yeats, The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 217.
7 See, for example, Phaedo, 82d-83b, trans. by G. M. A. Grube, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. by John 
M. Cooper (Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 49-100 (pp. 72-73).
8 Martin Heidegger, ʻThe Age of the World Pictureʼ, trans. by Julian Young in Martin Heidegger, Off the 
Beaten Track, ed. and trans. by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), pp. 157–99 (p. 66).
9 See, for example, John Cottingham Descartes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 11, Stephen Gaukroger 
Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 227 and p. 270, and Sawday 
The Body Emblazoned, pp. 146–158.
10 Descartes in: Thomas Steele Hall René Descartes: Treatise of Man (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1972) p. 1, and John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch 
(eds.) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), p. 99.
rationally knowable system. It was a world in which the subject as rational, knowing 
soul was conspicuous by its  absence, an implicit separation of mind from body that 
would inform his position in the Discourse on Method (1637) and the Meditations on 
First Philosophy (1641). As Jonathan Sawday has observed, the spirit of ‘Cartesian 
man’ was abroad before Descartes explicitly formulated it, exemplified in certain 
‘metaphysical’ poetry, such as John Donne’s  ‘The Ecstasy’, composed before 1614, 
which was in wide circulation before its publication in 1633:11 ‘It was in the anatomy 
theatres of Leiden and Amsterdam that Cartesian man was born, in the person of a 
grotesquely twitching criminal corpse, at the behest of the medical and juridical 
authorities of the city’.12  Following William Schupbach’s influential reading, which 
sees ‘the duality of man’s metaphysical status […] given visible form in the 
composition of Rembrandt’s painting’,13  Sawday argues for the ‘Cartesian nature of 
Rembrandt’s image’ as a ‘portrayal of the domination of intellect over the aberrant will 
of the executed felon’, a product of the problem of the relationship between the will 
and the intellect that Descartes  had been working on in his  Rules for the Direction of 
the Mind written shortly before his move to Holland, in 1628 or earlier.14 Rembrandt’s 
Anatomy may therefore be seen as contemporaneous with the intellectual milieu that 
gave birth to the Cartesian subject, a conception that installed the recipient of this 
‘certainty of representation’ – an incorporeal, sovereign, rational self – within the 
mechanical anatomy of the body: in it but not of it. By re-staging Rembrandt’s 
painting, The Anatomy Lesson of Dr Tulp, in 1968 and in Nüremberg, the site where 
the world learned the full extent of the irrational certainty of the ‘rationality’ of 
Auschwitz, Kantor appears to be articulating a very different and more subversive 
idea of life from the one represented by the sense of subjectivity implicit in the 
original painting. In doing so there appears to be a tacit critique of the idea of 
Enlightenment rational progress that resonates with Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. Kantor’s Anatomy seems to celebrate life not as the 
disembodied and sovereign subject of the Cartesian cogito – itself an echo of the 
Platonic dualism body and soul – nor as an object of representation, but as life that 
seems to be distributed and immanent within the poor matter of its clothing and 
possessions.
Instead of a reverential homage to Rembrandt’s  solemn anatomy, Kantor’s 
intention might at first appear satirical. The original painting has been interpreted as a 
celebration of the triumph of Dr Tulp’s rational intellect over the dead thief’s 
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11 See Sawday The Body Emblazoned, p. 296 ff. 18, and Theodore Redpath The Songs and Sonnets 
of John Donne (London: Methuen, 1956), p. 3.
12 Sawday The Body Emblazoned, p. 158.
13 William Schupbach The Paradox of Rembrandtʼs ʻAnatomy Lesson of Dr. Tulpʼ (London: Wellcome 
Institute for the History of Medicine, 1982), p. 44.
14 See Sawday, The Body Emblazoned, p. 153.
mechanical corpse.15  Kantor, however, in his work seems to be celebrating the 
ephemeral contents of the pockets of the clothing that wraps the body lying on his 
dissecting table. Rembrandt’s  painting would seem to have a high purpose, while 
Kantor’s happening would appear to revel in the low and the trivial. Such an 
appearance was one of several strategies of evasion used by Polish artists during 
the censorship of the socialist period. As I will show, however, this  ‘low’ quality is part 
of Kantor’s artistic purpose, and arose from the idea of the ‘reality of the lowest rank’, 
or ‘poor reality’.
Kantor’s happening was performed on four occasions between 1968 and 
1971. Each time he made use of found participants with which he composed his 
tableau according to the formal scheme of Rembrandt’s painting. He snipped with 
scissors at his  model’s  clothing, opening up the lining and paying particular attention 
to the contents of the ‘wrinkled and crushed | pockets’, ‘these intimate hiding places’, 
these ‘ridiculous  organs of | human instincts | […] for preservation and memory’. 
Thus anatomised, the torn clothing and the ‘forgotten leftovers’ and ‘shameful litter’ 
liberated from the pockets were glued and stapled to canvas to create an emballage: 
an artwork-assemblage or many-layered collage of tattered clothing and personal 
belongings that was in effect a ‘still life’ or nature mort.16
In staging his happening according to Rembrandt, Kantor appears to set the 
consequences of the Enlightenment project of positive, rational progress through 
scientific enquiry in stark juxtaposition to one of the iconic images of the origins of its 
dream. The corpse in Rembrandt’s painting becomes, in Kantor’s performance, an 
anonymous body whose clothing and belongings are coolly and methodically 
removed and processed, becoming in the end a ‘painting’ themselves. Kantor’s 
written partytura or ‘score’ for the happening clearly suggests that the seemingly 
trivial objects harvested from the model’s pockets  are ‘the genuine, | authentic side of 
| individuality’. In Kantor’s  anatomy the objects, in becoming a still-life, are seemingly 
more valued than the forgotten model. However, greater value is assigned to these 
objects precisely because of their reference to ‘authentic individuality’, whereas  in 
Rembrandt’s painting the bodily parts dissected – the flexor muscles of the forearm – 
are valued because of the general points they can make about the intricacy of 
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15 See Sawday, The Body Emblazoned, p. 153.
16  Emballage or ʻwrappingʼ, from the French verb  emballer (to wrap), was an element of Kantorʼs 
artistic practice that involved the ʻwrappingʼ  of people and everyday objects. As well as apparently 
protecting its contents, the wrapping served both to conceal and at the same time to reveal their 
presence. In so doing, the emballage also drew attention to itself as a representative of poor, marginal 
reality, occupying a liminal place between its contents and the observer. In essence, Kantorʼs Anatomy 
Lesson According to Rembrandt is an anatomy of clothing foregrounded as an emballage of the 
human being; the resulting exhibition of the clothing glued to the canvas is, in effect, an exhibition of 
this dissected ʻwrappingʼ or emballage. See Kantorʼs ʻManifest Ambalażyʼ  in Tadeusz Kantor, Pisma, 
ed. by Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz, 3 vols (Wrocław and Kraków: Ossolineum and Cricoteka, 2004-2005), 
I, pp. 300-04, and ʻThe Emballage Manifestoʼ in Michal Kobialka, Further on, Nothing: Tadeusz 
Kantorʼs Theatre  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), pp. 154-58. See also Kobialkaʼs 
discussion of the specificity of this idea in Kantorʼs work in Further on, Nothing, pp. 70-74.
anatomical mechanisms: the corpse’s individuality is not of interest. It is the 
demonstration of the power of rational knowledge that is of importance.
Rembrandt’s painting has been viewed as  a dramatisation of the historical 
moment of separation of the human soul from its  bodily machine, and a celebration of 
the triumph of the rational intellect over the substance of nature. This  victory, which 
heralded the coming of Enlightenment science, was to liberate Western Philosophy 
from the post-Aristotelian confusions of Scholastic thought. As Sawday has argued, 
this  Cartesian rationalisation was of a new, thinking subject, freed of its entanglement 
with troublesome matter, a new ‘us’ able to gaze clearly and distinctly, to use 
Descartes’ words, on the material of God’s creation, understand its workings, and in 
so doing put it to rational use.17  However, the new Cartesian system in a sense 
merely internalised an ancient schism between Being as ousia (substance), and the 
concepts of becoming and appearance. In Martin Heidegger’s  account in his  1935 
lecture course Introduction to Metaphysics, for the ancient Greeks the apparent 
opposition between Parmenides’ conception of Being as changelessness and 
Heraclitus’ conception of Being as becoming was understood in a unitary way,18 just 
as appearance was understood to share in the essence of Being, to be an aspect of 
it (‘appearing belongs to Being […] Being has its essence together with appearing’).19 
In contrast to this unity, the gaze of the new Cartesian rational subject itself tacitly 
embodies the schism by conceiving of the world as one in which the subject can only 
know the objective world via potentially unreliable sensory representations. In this 
system, however, the subject that succeeds in installing itself as sovereign wields the 
power to establish what Michel Foucault has characterised as a ‘biological-type 
caesura within a population’ that allows the population to be represented ‘as a 
mixture of races, or to be more accurate, […] to subdivide the species it controls, into 
the subspecies known, precisely as races’.20  Paradoxically the fragmentation of the 
world understood in terms of representational ontology renders potentially vulnerable 
all those subject to what Foucault has termed ‘biopower’.
As Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer argued influentially in 1944 in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, one of the possible destinations of the hyper-rationalised 
use of science is Auschwitz.21  There, the sovereign, rational intellect turned human 
beings into parts of a machine in which they themselves were anatomised and 
rendered into their inanimate components: skin, hair, and gold teeth, to be processed 
alongside the variety of their personal belongings by the Sonderkommando, special 
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17 See Sawday, The Body Emblazoned, p. 151.
18  Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 103.
19 Ibid., p. 108; emphasis in the original.
20 Michel Foucault, ʻSociety Must Be Defendedʼ: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-1976, trans. 
by David Macey, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson (London: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 254.
21 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. 
by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
groups who sorted through the mounds of bodies and clothing outside the gas 
chambers in order to harvest ‘useful’ commodities prior to the bodies’ incineration in 
the crematoria. It is not only those bodies that are decomposed in that image of 
commodification, but also the ‘humanity’ of every survivor and the various category of 
‘worker’ in the factory of the camps. The Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi has written 
about the testimony of Miklos Nyiszli, a Hungarian physician ‘one of the very few 
survivors of the last Special Squad
 in Auschwitz’.22 One episode that Nyiszli recounted Levi found particularly significant:
So, Nyiszli tells how during a ‘work’ pause he attended a soccer game 
between the SS and the SK (Sonderkommandos), that is  to say, between a 
group representing the SS on guard at the crematorium and a group 
representing the Special Squad. Other men of the SS and the rest of the 
squad are present at the game; they take sides, bet, applaud, urge the players 
on as if, rather than at the gates of hell, the game were taking place on the 
village green.23 
In his book, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, the contemporary 
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben reflects that: ‘This match might strike someone 
as a brief pause of humanity in the middle of an infinite horror. I, like the witnesses, 
instead view this match, this moment of normalcy, as the true horror of the camp. […] 
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22 Primo Levi The Drowned and the Saved, trans. by Raymond Rosenthal (London: Abacus, 1989), p. 
37. According to Levi, Nyiszli, a renowned pathologist ʻwhose services Mengele […] had securedʼ was 
ʻsupposed to devote himself in particular to the study of twins […] Alongside this particular task of his, 
to which, it should be said in passing, it does not appear he strenuously objected, Nyiszli was also the 
attending physician of the squad, with which he lived in close contactʼ (Ibid., p. 37). Nyiszliʼs 
reminiscences were originally published in New York in 1960 and republished as Miklos Nyiszli 
Auschwitz: A Doctorʼs Eyewitness Account, trans. Tibère Kremer and Richard Seaver (New York: 
Arcade Publishing 1993). The soccer match episode occurs in chapter IX (Nyiszli 1993, p. 68). Levi 
recounts that:
An extreme case of collaboration is represented by the Sonderkommandos of 
Auschwitz and the other extermination camps. Here one hesitates to speak of 
privilege: whoever belonged to this group was privileged only to the extent that—but 
at what cost—he had enough to eat for a few months, certainly not because he could 
be envied. With this duly vague definition, ʻSpecial Squadʼ, the SS referred to the 
group of prisoners who were entrusted with the running of the crematoria. It was their 
task to maintain order among the new arrivals (often completely unaware of the 
destiny awaiting them) who must be sent into the gas chambers; to extract the 
corpses from the chambers, pull gold teeth from jaws, cut the womenʼs hair, sort and 
classify clothes, shoes, and the contents of the luggage; transport the bodies to the 
crematoria and oversee the operation of the ovens; extract and eliminate the ashes.
(Ibid., p. 34)
In order to ensure that they would not be able to speak of what they had seen, Levi reports, these 
groups were allowed to operate for only a few months before they were themselves exterminated. ʻ[A]
s its initiation the next squad burnt the corpses of its predecessors.ʼ In all, twelve squads operated 
during the life of Auschwitz (ibid.).
23 Ibid., p. 38.
[T]hat match is never over’.24 The implication is that it is the very unseen negativity at 
the heart of this simulacrum of normalcy that constitutes the hidden idea of humanity: 
a fragile thing of which the failure to acknowledge the awful, bare emptiness of its 
negation is itself a sort of crime. I shall later locate this idea in Kantor’s happening.
Kantor received the news in April 1942 that his estranged father, Marian 
Kantor, had been shot in one of the quarries  in Auschwitz.25  Although Kantor was 
never there, he was nonetheless a witness  to part of the machine of extermination. In 
November of that year Kantor, along with his mother and his sister’s  family, was 
resettled to an apartment building on Węgierska Street in the Podgórze district of 
Kraków.26  The building stood within the original boundaries of Kraków’s Jewish 
ghetto, which had been established in 1941 by the Germans when they evicted the 
Jews from Kazimierz, the ‘Galician Jerusalem’: the historical centre of economic and 
intellectual life for Polish Jews since the fourteenth-century.27 The Galician suburb of 
Podgórze, situated just across  the Vistula river from Kazimierz, was a rundown 
former merchants’ residential area. The ghetto was intended to be an incubator of 
contagious diseases, such as typhoid, which the Germans hoped would accomplish 
the extermination of the population of Kraków’s Jews.28 It was enclosed within three-
metre high walls, which parodied Jewish tombstones.29  Following reductions in the 
ghetto’s size, Kantor and his family came to be resettled next to the ghetto boundary 
in March 1942.30 That June, the SS assumed authority over the ghetto and in the first 
few days massacred approximately six hundred Jews in Plac Zgody, the main 
square, and in the surrounding streets; seven thousand more were sent to the gas 
chambers.31  Further large-scale massacres and deportations to the death camps 
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24 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive: Homo Sacer III, trans. by 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2002), p. 26.
25 Various dates have been reported for this event; however, Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz gives the date as 
4April 1942, according to Marian Kantorʼs nephew, Józef Zdzisław Kantor. See Pleśniarowiczʼs two 
books Kantor: Artysta końca wieku (Kantor. Artist of the Turn of the Century) (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo 
Dolnośląskie, 1997), p. 12, and The Dead Memory Machine: Tadeusz Kantorʼs Theatre of Death, 
trans. by William Brandt (Aberystwyth: Black Mountain Press, 2004) p. 14. See also Zdzisław Kantor, 
Marian Kantor-Mirski (1884–1942) (Kraków and Tychy: Teatr Mały and Cricoteka, 2004), p. 26.
26 See Pleśniarowicz 2004, p. 35 and Chrobak, J., Kulka, E. & Tomaszewski, T. (Eds.) „Powrót Odysa" 
i Podziemny Teatr Niezależny Tadeusza Kantora w latach 1942-1944 cz. I ["The Return of Oddysseus" 
and the Clandestine Independent Theatre of Tadeusz Kantor in the Years 1942-1944, part 1], (Kraków: 
Cricoteka., 2004), pp. 38–39.
27 Anna Jodłowiec-Dziedzic, The Holocaust of Cracow Jews 1939-1945, trans. by Małgorzata Walczak 
(Kraków: The Historical Museum of the City of Cracow, 2004), p 3.
28 Ibid., p. 8.
29 Ibid.
30 See Tadeusz Kantor: Wędrówka (Tadeusz Kantor: A Journey), ed. by Józef Chrobak, Lech Stangret, 
and Marek Świca (Kraków: Cricoteka, 2000), p. 27; Pleśniarowicz, Kantor. Artysta Końca wieku, p. 41, 
and The Dead Memory Machine, p. 35.
31 Jodłowiec-Dziedzic, The Holocaust of Cracow Jews 1939-1945, p. 11.
occurred in October of that year. The ghetto was finally ‘liquidated’ in March 1943 and 
its entire Jewish population was either killed there or transported to the death 
camps.32
Kantor’s living situation at that time brought him into close proximity with the 
doomed Jewish population of the ghetto. His officially registered work during 1942-43 
was in the stage-workshops for the Juliusz Słowacki Theatre which, following the 
removal of Jews to Podgórze, had been relocated to the Izaak Synagogue, in the 
heart of Kazimierz.33 In order to get to and from his place of work, Kantor would have 
had to pass over the only open bridge between Podgórze and Kazimierz, the 
Piłsudski Bridge. This necessitated his passing along Limanowski Street, where the 
reduction of the ghetto had divided the street along its  middle with a barbed-wire 
fence, which formed the new ghetto boundary.34 Anyone walking or travelling by tram 
along this street must have been profoundly aware of the figures on the other side of 
that fence, already marked by degradation and death. As Kantor articulated it in his 
twelfth Milano Lesson: ‘World War II. | Genocide, | Concentration Camps, | 
Crematories, | Human Beasts, | Death, | Tortures, | Human kind turned into mud, 
soap and ashes, | Debasement, | The time of contempt…’35
Kantor’s daily confrontation with an erased or virtually erased humanity 
became a source for his  artistic theory and practice at this time. It was  probably 
during this period, when Kantor was working on what was to be the final underground 
production for his Clandestine Independent Theatre (The Return of Odysseus by 
Stanisław Wyspiański, 1944) that he first formulated his idea of ‘poor reality’ or ‘reality 
of the lowest rank’. Denied their own cultural practice by the occupying forces, many 
young Polish intellectuals turned to the work of the inter-war avant-garde, one of 
whose key figures was the Jewish writer and graphic artist, Bruno Schulz. Born in the 
provincial Galician town of Drohobycz (now in the Ukraine), Schulz had achieved 
fame in the 1930s with the publication of two volumes of his  short stories, Cinnamon 
Shops (1934) and Sanatorium Under the Sign of the Hourglass (1937). Schulz was 
shot in his home-town by a Gestapo officer in November 1942 and so neither his 
writing nor his graphic work bears  any direct reflection of the reality under German 
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33 See Tadeusz Kantor: Wędrówka, p. 28; Pleśniarowicz, Kantor. Artysta Końca wieku, p. 42, and The 
Dead Memory Machine, p. 35.
34  I am grateful to Pani Anna Pióro, the curator of the Apteka pod Orłem museum, for her help  in 
understanding the changing topographical reality of the Podgórze ghetto and for granting me access 
to historical maps and photographs of the ghetto. I am also grateful to the late Mike Staner, a survivor 
of the Podgórze ghetto who lived at 12 Węgierska Street whilst it was still within the ghetto, and who 
described to me at length the situation of the reality at that time.
35  Tadeusz Kantor, A Journey through Other Spaces: Essays and Manifestos, 1944-1990, ed. by 
Michal Kobialka (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 259. See also the first Milano 
Lesson, p. 211.
occupation.36 However, Kantor was reading Schulz’s  fictions avidly at this  time.37 The 
connections with what the critic Artur Sandauer was to later term the ‘degraded 
reality’ in Schulz’s fictions, and the reality both of his own existence as a Pole under 
German occupation and as a witness to the condition of the Jewish population in the 
ghetto are stark.38 After the war Schulz’s  work was not available in Poland until 1964, 
when Polish cultural identity remained suppressed, though this time under the 
various manifestations of ‘real socialism’.
As Czesław Prokopczyk has noted, the notion of ‘degraded’, ‘bankrupt’, or 
‘marginal’ reality in Schulz centres  on the Polish word tandeta. The meaning of this 
word, he says:
may be understood, to put it simply and visually, as the lowest layer, or the 
lowest, though for some intriguing reasons favourite, subspecies of the 
ordinary in the world of Schulz’s fiction. It is the layer of shoddy and cheap 
products, of trumpery and lack of taste, of ‘depraved’ human characters, or 
possibly even of crippled and deformed beings.39
In Schulz’s fictional universe this degraded reality takes many forms, but in general it 
seems to derive from the deeply felt paucity of provincial life, the sense that what 
passed for reality in the town of Drohobycz was somehow a second-rate imitation of 
the reality of a Kraków or a Warsaw. Reality in Schulz’s fiction is said to be ‘as thin as 
paper and betrays with all its cracks its imitative character’.40  It ‘exists in a state of 
constant fermentation, germination, hidden life’ and ‘takes on certain shapes merely 
for the sake of appearance, as a joke or form of play’.41 It is as if, because provincial 
reality has no substance, it occupies itself with ‘the assuming and consuming of 
numberless masks. This migration of forms is the essence of life’.42 
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Theodosia S. Robertson (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), pp. 137-38, for an account of the 
circumstances of Schulzʼs death.
37 See Kantorʼs comments in Krzysztof Miklaszewski, Encounters with Tadeusz Kantor, trans. by G. M. 
Hyde (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 32-33 and 37; Pleśniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine, p. 27.
38 Artur Sandauer, ʻRzeczywistość zdegradowana (rzecz o Brunonie Schulzu)ʼ (The Degraded Reality 
(On Bruno Schulz)), in Bruno Schulz, Sklepy cynamonowe. Sanatorium pod Klepsydrą (Kraków and 
Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1985), pp. 5-33.
39  Czeslaw Z. Prokopczyk, ʻThe Mythical and the Ordinary in Bruno Schulzʼ, in Bruno Schulz: New 
Documents and Interpretations, ed. by Czeslaw Z. Prokopczyk (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), pp. 
175-209 (p. 206).
40  Bruno Schulz, The Fictions of Bruno Schulz: The Street of Crocodiles and Sanatorium under the 
Sign of the Hourglass, trans. by Celina Wieniewska (London: Picador, 1988), p. 73.
41 Jerzy Ficowski, Letters and Drawings of Bruno Schulz with Selected Prose, trans. by William Arendt 
with Victoria Nelson (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), p. 113.
42 Ibid.
It is not hard to see how this presentation of reality might have spoken to 
Kantor in his  situation at this time. The German occupation made explicit and all-too-
concrete a ranking of humanity that had existed in a less structured way before the 
war. However, under occupation Germans assumed the highest rank, Poles became 
their inferiors, whilst Jews occupied the lowest rank of all: according to Hitler and the 
SS they were beneath even the lowest rank of humanity.43 As Agamben has noted:
The truth – which is  difficult for the victims to face, but which we must have the 
courage not to cover with sacrificial veils  – is  that the Jews were exterminated 
not in a mad and giant holocaust but exactly as Hitler had announced, ‘as lice’, 
which is to say, as bare life. The dimension in which the extermination took 
place is neither religion nor law, but biopolitics.44
Such a pressure of reality clearly produces ‘degradation’ at many levels. 
However, it was not merely as a description of the ‘bankruptcy of reality’, of ‘that city 
of cheap human material’ that Schulz’s metaphysical prose would have been 
attractive to Kantor.45  More than merely black humour, ‘degraded’ reality somehow 
offers a certain hope in Schulz’s depictions in that it takes on a celebratory quality 
and assumes a playful self-sufficiency. Thus, in his  ‘Treatise on Tailor’s  Dummies, or 
The Second Book of Genesis’, Jakob, the narrator’s father declares that:
Matter has been given infinite fertility, inexhaustible vitality, and, at the same 
time, a seductive power of temptation which invites  us to create as well. In the 
depth of matter, indistinct smiles are shaped, tensions build up, attempts  at 
form appear. The whole of matter pulsates with infinite possibilities that send 
dull shivers through it. […] It entices us with a thousand sweet, soft, round 
shapes which it blindly dreams up within itself. […] We are simply entranced 
and enchanted by the cheapness, shabbiness and inferiority of material.46
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43 See Norman Davies, Godʼs Playground: A History of Poland, Volume I, 1795 to the Present (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 445-46. From this simple tripartite hierarchy developed a complex 
web  of resistance, of corruption and collaboration, of heroism and cowardice. Some Jews worked for 
the Gestapo to police Jews under the auspices of the Judenrat (Jewish Council). Some Poles 
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living next to the Jewish ghetto would obviously not have helped his situation in that reality. According 
to the Nüremberg regulations Kantor was officially classed as Nichtdeutsch or non-German (therefore 
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and ʻcheckedʼ  on the way to and from his home next to the Podgórze ghetto; that is, stopped by 
Germans patrols or their Polish collaborators and forced to drop his trousers to prove he was not 
circumcised. I am grateful to the late Mike Staner for describing to me the environment of ʻcheckingʼ 
around this time, both by Germans and by gangs of certain categories of collaborators. I am also 
grateful to Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz who told me that Kantor had made it clear on several occasions 
both publicly and privately that he had been a victim of such checking.
44  Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 114.
45 Bruno Schulz, The Fictions of Bruno Schulz, p. 76.
46 Ibid., pp. 39 and 41.
In his 1968 commentary on the contents of his model’s pockets, Kantor expressed 
this Schulzian sense of enchantment.
The reality of occupied Kraków was one where the metamorphosis  of animate 
to inanimate body was a casual fact of daily life, where mounds of clothing or 
belongings indicated the recently departed presence of a human life just as  much as 
its corpse.47  In such a degraded reality, where the already lowered quality of life 
could be reduced further still, to dead matter, it is not surprising that Kantor would be 
drawn to Schulz’s brand of quasi-panpsychism, to this exotic version of the 
Aristotelian conception of hylomorphism: of form and matter (a conception that 
perhaps also anticipates later ideas such as Gilles Deleuze’s vitalist concept of 
immanence).48 The cheapness of life somehow heightens  the awareness of the awful 
bare emptiness of its potential negation but it somehow also becomes a cause of 
celebration and a form of resistance to the forces of degradation and negation.
In his article ‘Cinnamon Shops by Bruno Schulz: The Apology of Tandeta’, 
Andreas Schönle argues that it is ‘the privileged position of tandeta that […] it 
mediates between form and matter’.49 In its imitation of form, tandeta ‘fakes a definite 
appearance, without, however, merging completely with it’.50  The faking ‘a definite 
appearance’ would appear to be a deliberate paradox designed to call into question 
the conventional ranking of ‘appearance’ as  ontologically inferior to authentic, 
substantial being. In his book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Giorgio 
Agamben uses an obscure figure from Roman law to articulate a similar paradox of 
negativity at the heart of human being that seems to echo the celebration of tandeta. 
The figure of homo sacer (sacred man) is one who through being banished from the 
law occupies a liminal state of being, of ‘bare life’, that is, the life of one ‘who may by 
killed and yet not sacrificed’.51  Drawing on the work of Carl Schmitt in Political 
Theology and his discussion of the ‘state of exception’, Agamben develops this idea 
to cite the bare life of homo sacer as  emblematic of the condition of human being as 
a being existing essentially in a liminal zone between biological existence and 
political life: between nature and culture.52 This  is a Heideggerian concept of human 
being as a continually becoming-appearance, of an existential performance as 
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48  See Gilles Deleuze, ʻImmanence: A Lifeʼ, in Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, trans. by Anne 
Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), pp. 25-33; Giorgio Agamben, ʻAbsolute Immanenceʼ, in his 
Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 220-39.
49 Andreas Schönle, ʻCinnamon Shops by Bruno Schulz: The Apology of Tandetaʼ, The Polish Review, 
36 (1991), 127-44 (p. 131).
50 Ibid.
51 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 8; emphasis in the original.
52  See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. by 
George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
opposed to an essentialist substance.53 If bare life is part of this  existentialist essence 
of human being then it is in the self-recognition of it as such – the human-as-abject-
being – that affords recognition of the ‘genuine, | authentic side of | individuality’. 
What is discarded or forgotten is  therefore salvaged and redeemed in a way that also 
echoes Walter Benjamin’s conception of messianic time in his 1940 essay ‘On the 
Concept of History’.54
The celebration of tandeta in Schulz’s fictions can therefore be seen as a re-
appropriation of degradation (or in Kantor’s terms ‘reality of the lowest rank’) for 
creative purposes.55 This is  shown in Kantor’s happening, as the separation of layer 
from layer of clothing leads to the abrupt discovery of ‘new interior worlds’, which 
open up to reveal the almost non-Euclidean space of the ‘antipodes of clothing’: 
‘pockets! | lots  of pockets!’ As Kantor delves into this interior world of his model’s 
clothing, the cotton padding spills  out of the lining. Unravelling and proliferating 
seemingly out of proportion to the confined space of its origins, this padding seems to 
echo the ‘fluffiness and porosity’ of matter celebrated by the father in Schulz’s 
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garde, such as informel, minimalism, and Arte Povera, as well as happenings, which Kantor 
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9-10). Indeed, although a quality of tandeta  can be discerned in the work of many artists such as, for 
example, Joseph Beuys and Christian Boltanski, the Schulzian reading of Kantorʼs happening would 
be very different from the way Happenings are often seen as orgiastic or as developing out of abstract 
expressionism, or informel, where Kantorʼs appropriation of that form had darker resonances (see 
Edward Krasiński, and Magalena Kardasz, ʻA Happening is a work of art, and not a brawlʼ, trans. by 
Jadwiga Piątkowska and Maciej Głogoczowski, in Tadeusz Kantor: Niemożliwe/Impossible, ed. by 
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And, although Beuysʼ presence in his own work might also be seen as similar to Kantor in terms of 
philosophical or spiritual inclination, his metaphysical concerns are more shamanistic, overtly mystical 
and rooted in German Romanticism and his politics more overtly engaged. Kantorʼs metaphysical 
concerns are – following Schulz – perhaps more ironic about transforming ordinary lowly material into 
something deeply meaningful.
‘Treatise’.56  Similarly, the objects that Kantor harvests from this model’s  pockets, 
whilst initially innocuous, seem gradually to change and proliferate in the partytura as 
the catalogue of items progresses. From the innocent and trivial ‘gnawed pencils’ and 
‘toothbrushes’, the list proceeds  to more personal objects in the form of photographs. 
However, these consist not only of the normal and expected pictures of ‘family’ and 
‘children’ but progress  to the more illicit pictures of a ‘lover’ and pornography. As 
Kantor continues to unpack the pockets  he discovers ‘condoms’, ‘stolen teaspoons’, 
and finally the escalating violence of ‘penknives’, ‘knives’, and ‘guns’. There is 
therefore a sense, as with Schulzian matter, that the inanimate objects associated 
with the anonymous and forgotten model have a subversive life and humanity of their 
own; that, as the father in Schulz’s ‘Treatise’ expounds, ‘There is  no dead matter […] 
lifelessness is only a disguise behind which hide unknown forms of life’.57  There is 
also a sense in which the objects come to refer back to the subject of human 
individuality, not of the anonymous model alone but paradoxically, of the individuality 
of everyone. Kantor’s harvesting of objects  may recall the harvesting of useful 
commodities by the Sonderkommandos from the dead victims of the gas chambers. 
However, through his performative manipulation of the clothing and objects 
associated with his model, Kantor can be understood to be accessing Schulz’s 
subversive conception of form and matter so that these items take on, as it were, a 
life of their own. In this  dance of becoming and seeming, rather than obediently 
remaining in their category of ‘conventional | or insignificant outward appearance’, 
these items are liberated from the state of utter abjection that would otherwise seem 
to be the fate of Adriaen Adriaenszoon, the subject of Tulp’s anatomy, or the dead 
victims of Podgórze or Auschwitz.
Kantor wrote elsewhere that ‘The human form is shaped on the border area of 
a live, suffering organism and | a mechanism | functioning automatically and 
absurdly’.58  In this conception, Kantor encapsulates the paradoxical fragility of the 
bare life of human being, suspended between the mechanism of Cartesian matter 
and the pre-Cartesian animating principle of Aristotelian form, between zoē and bios, 
between nature and culture, between the apparent oppositions between Being and 
becoming, and between Being and seeming. In doing so, both here and implicitly in 
what might now be seen as his revision of Rembrandt’s  Anatomy, Kantor has 
reconfigured the separate, fragmented, and incorporeal nature of Cartesian res 
cogitans in a manner that has  allowed a sense of human soul to return via the illegal, 
poor side-door of tandeta, in a way that prefigures a Deleuzian conception of 
immanence. Where Rembrandt’s Dr Tulp found soulless, mechanical material in 
Adriaenszoon’s dissected forearm and hand, Kantor found a form of humanity and 
soul in the dissected clothing and contents of his  model’s pockets. In response to the 
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57 Ibid., p. 40.
58  ʻPostać ludzka kształtuje się na pograniczu | żywego, cierpiącego organizmu i | mechanizmu | 
funkcjonującego automatycznie i absurdalnieʼ (Kantor, Pisma, I, pp. 111-12; my translation).
unseen negativity at the heart of the football match that Agamben says is never over, 
and to the potential threat of the awful, bare emptiness of the negation of human life, 
Kantor’s Anatomy Lesson was a public celebration of humanity and soul within the 
‘reality of the lowest rank’.
Acknowledging the dangers implicit in the Cartesian cogito, this gesture by 
Kantor invokes  a more vitalist sense of life, one that is virtual and distributed within 
matter itself: a sense of life that speaks and sings itself through the clothing and 
possessions that remain after the human body has been discarded. This Deleuzian 
sense of immanence hovers  on the borderline between being and not-being, 
suggesting a sense of the self of bare human life being ‘held out into the nothing’, as 
the Heideggerian conception characterises it.59  Echoing Heidegger’s  ‘nothing of 
being’, Deleuze suggested in the last text published before his death that ‘the 
immanent that is  in nothing is  itself a life’;60 the ‘life of the individual fades away in 
favor of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he 
can be mistaken for no other’.61  In his version of Rembrandt’s Anatomy Lesson, 
Tadeusz Kantor, rather than celebrating the rational, sovereign, disembodied subject 
of the Cartesian cogito celebrates the liminal, immanent, bare life of tandeta. Where, 
in Rembrandt’s  painting, the coat stolen by his subject is forgotten, Kantor’s  response 
is to let the tattered clothing sing for itself.
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Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 82-96 (p. 93).
60 See Agamben, ʻAbsolute Immanenceʼ, p. 220.
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